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Throughout this work, Macgregor pro-
vides specific and concrete examples of
problems and solutions. He explains,
for instance, how the Army should
align itself in a joint architecture based
on combat maneuver groups composed
of light reconnaissance, airborne as-
sault, aviation combat, and early de-
ploying support. The purpose of such
groups is to integrate lean fighting units
with powerful strike assets that are not
only lethal in combat but have the nec-
essary strategic agility to achieve rapid
decisive results. Lest the reader think
that Macgregor is a proponent of
smaller and lighter forces, he also
makes clear there can be no substitute
for superior firepower in any fight. In
examining the most recent U.S. combat
experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq,
Macgregor notes that the real challenge
of the close fight is that “the advantage
of information dominance diminishes
considerably”; “old-fashioned fire-
power delivered in mass” remains
essential.
The conclusion reminds us that the na-
ture of warfare will continue to change
and that the need for transformation
will only grow in importance as our en-
emies adapt to our past successes. The
process of transformation, he points
out, however, is not the sole responsi-
bility or purview of the Army—it re-
quires the best civilian and military
minds. Macgregor’s effort goes a long
way toward furthering that thinking
and is a must read for those who wish
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Analysts and observers interested in
global security issues would do well to
pay closer attention to the always rich
debate in Indian security circles about
that country’s future national policies,
supporting budgets, and force struc-
tures. India is a rising power with a rap-
idly growing economy, an increasing
military budget, and in some key areas,
a newly enhanced national will to trans-
late its potential into broader influence
on the world stage. These two books are
excellent examples of the national de-
bate on how India should use its power
to protect and advance its growing na-
tional interests. Each covers specific
elements of India’s national security—
nuclear weapons and maritime security.
Bharat Karnad is an unabashed advo-
cate of a robust Indian nuclear weapons
structure, doctrine, and policy. Karnad,
a national security policy analyst at an
Indian think tank, the Centre for Policy
Research in New Delhi, was a member
of the First National Security Advisor
Board to the National Security Council
of India. In that capacity, he was a
member of the Nuclear Doctrine
Drafting Group. In the wake of India’s
May 1998 nuclear weapons tests, the
group produced a draft nuclear doc-
trine that was submitted to the National
Security Council in August 1999. (After
significant delay, the essence of the doc-
trine was adopted formally in January
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2003.) The author is squarely and
proudly in the realist school of political
science, basing his arguments and as-
sessments on the proposition that the
world is an anarchic place, that states
are the primary international actors,
and that power—with military power at
its core—is all that matters.
The book is sweeping in scope. Karnad
is prescriptive and uses his interpreta-
tion of history to create a strong case
for his prescribed end state for India
and its nuclear forces. This end state
consists of a nuclear force for India
containing 350–400 nuclear warheads/
weapons, some with megaton yields,
and a set of delivery systems that in-
cludes “sizable numbers” of interconti-
nental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and
long-range cruise missiles. Given what
the author assumes will be the ICBM
force’s problems with accuracy, he rec-
ommends a countervalue strategy that
he deems sufficient to deter U.S. inter-
vention in Indian affairs. He also notes
that a force of this size and structure
would be sufficient to achieve notional
parity with China.
While it is easy to focus on the headline-
making conclusions that arise from
Karnad’s tome, a reader would do well
to take the time to read the entire piece
carefully. The first half of the book is a
comprehensive history and analysis of
India’s evolution as a nuclear power. In
this section, the author convincingly
challenges conventional wisdom about
the teachings and actions of India’s re-
vered “father of the nation,” Mahatma
Gandhi. Karnad argues that the nation’s
misinterpretations of Gandhi’s teach-
ings gave rise to a mistaken, and strate-
gically misguided, “moralpolitik” that
limited India’s ability to act decisively
to advance and protect its own national
interests in a Hobbesian world. In fact,
the author seeks to debunk the oft-cited
link between this moralpolitik and
traditional Indian culture and values as
expressed in the texts of ancient India.
The result of this political philosophy,
which championed morality in pursuit
of interests and led to “doctrinaire posi-
tions on the exercise of force” was that
India as a collective lacked the will to
achieve power in the decades following
its independence.
In the second thematic half of the book,
a 250-page chapter 5, Karnad uses more
recent historical examples and analyses
of real and potential great-power sce-
narios to make the case that India must
fashion a set of nuclear doctrines, poli-
cies, and capabilities to advance its re-
gional and global interests. Specifically,
he warns against deterrence by “half-
measures,” noting that India cannot
rely on other powers to protect it. Spe-
cifically, he argues that U.S. and Indian
interests, even currently, are likely to
converge only in the short term and
that India must have the military
wherewithal, specifically in the nuclear
realm, to ensure that it does not be-
come a vassal of Washington.
Roy-Chaudhury’s book also delves into
an element of India’s national security
and the appropriate policy to address it,
but his area of focus is one less fraught
with potential controversy—maritime
security. His recommended course of
action, that India adopt a new maritime
security policy to update and expand
the outdated and inadequate Ocean
Policy Statement of 1982, is also less
alarming. Roy-Chaudhury’s study is a
natural follow-up to his Sea Power and
Indian Security (Brassey’s, 1995), which
was favorably reviewed in the Summer
1996 issue of this journal. While his
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previous book chronicled Indian naval
developments, this work deftly outlines
the maritime dimensions of India’s se-
curity—economic, political, and mili-
tary—and suggests the development of
an overall policy framework to tie them
together.
Roy-Chaudhury is currently a Fellow
for South Asia at the International In-
stitute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in
London. This book was written while
he was a research fellow at the Institute
for Defense Studies and Analysis
(IDSA), a think tank funded by India’s
Ministry of Defense. While at IDSA,
Roy-Chaudhury specialized in naval
and maritime security affairs, and the
combination of his time in this envi-
ronment and his previous studies
makes him eminently qualified to pro-
duce a volume on such a subject.
The author outlines India’s impressive
economic growth in the last decade
and the international, particularly
maritime, implications of that trend.
In essence, India has become more de-
pendent on trade for its prosperity,
and, in turn, it has become more reliant
on such imported resources as crude
oil, with consumption of petroleum
products rising during the 1990s more
or less at the same rate as India’s gross
domestic product—about 7 percent per
annum. Roy-Chaudhury picks up the
concerns of his first book about the im-
portance of a viable national merchant
fleet in addition to a navy for a coun-
try’s security, noting that India’s rap-
idly growing trade is not being met by a
similar growth in either India’s mer-
chant fleet or port handling capacity.
The author describes a range of interna-
tional economic groupings to which
India became a member in the 1990s
and how those may bolster even further
India’s trade ties.
He goes on to discuss India’s rights and
interests in its exclusive economic zone,
the maritime portions of India’s long-
standing rivalry with Pakistan, and the
rise of such new, nonstate security is-
sues in the Indian Ocean as piracy and
arms and narcotics trafficking. He high-
lights the changing capabilities of four
countries with naval presence in the
Indian Ocean, making the case that
more traditional security issues remain
salient and indeed may grow in their
maritime dimensions. He then essen-
tially picks up from his earlier book and
describes the Indian Navy’s moderniza-
tion over the decade of the 1990s. Here
he notes that despite increasing mari-
time security issues and increased atten-
tion paid to the navy, the recommended
force structure outlined in 1964, consist-
ing of fifty-four principal combatants,
has yet to be reached. Where Karnad
attributes shortfalls in India’s nuclear
forces primarily to a lack of political will,
Roy-Chaudhury makes a more mixed
case for the navy’s shortfall. He notes the
lack of funding over the years, the col-
lapse of India’s primary supplier (the
Soviet Union) in the early 1990s, and
the slow transition of India from a buyer
of combatants to a builder.
Roy-Chaudhury concludes, after a dis-
cussion of naval cooperation, that the
various dimensions of India’s security
that rely on the sea are growing more
important, not less. Therefore, he rec-
ommends that the Indian government
as a whole, not just the navy or the
Ministry of Defense, adopt a national-
level maritime security policy, essentially
an updated and expanded ocean policy
statement. He was brought into the
National Security Council Secretariat to
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implement such a recommendation.
While a draft policy was drawn up in
2001, it has yet to be promulgated,
pending the formation of greater insti-
tutional links among various Indian
ministries with responsibilities in this
area. The Ministry of Defense was
tasked to initiate such an
interministerial coordinating body, but
so far the policy has not been formal-
ized. Even without such a public policy,
India is moving ahead with enhancing
its maritime security in all its spheres.
ANDREW C. WINNER
Naval War College
Smith, Edward A., Jr. Effects Based Operations:
Applying Network-centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis,
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2002. 545pp. $20
“Effects-based operations [EBO] are co-
ordinated sets of actions directed at
shaping the behavior of friends, foes,
and neutrals in peace, crisis, and war.”
This definition is offered in Edward
Smith’s long, tortuous study, Effects
Based Operations. Substitute the terms
“speeches by the president,” “negotia-
tions by diplomats,” or “economic
sanctions” for “effects-based opera-
tions,” and the emptiness of this defini-
tion becomes all too evident.
The major difficulty with this work,
however, lies in the following passage:
“The very nature of military competi-
tion should make it clear that would-be
foes will attempt to exploit any warfare
niche in which they believe the United
States and its allies cannot successfully
engage. Logically, these would-be foes
will see exploitable niches wherever
network-centric and effects-based oper-
ations are least applicable. Urban and
guerrilla warfare, counter-terrorism op-
erations, peacekeeping efforts, and hos-
tage rescues are just a few examples.”
With this statement, Smith has gratu-
itously undermined the importance and
value of effects-based operations (drag-
ging network-centric operations along
in the process), for those “niches” con-
stitute the shortlist of operations U.S.
military forces will be undertaking for
the foreseeable future.
This is a complex and ambitious book,
which progresses from a general dis-
cussion of EBO through chapters that
illustrate the relationship with network-
centric operations, discuss operations
in the cognitive domain, and describe
how complexity factors into the pic-
ture. Toward the end of the book an
operational example is offered before
some general conclusions are reached.
Effects-based operations, we are repeat-
edly reminded, focus on the mind of
man. The “effects-based strategy is con-
ceived and executed as a direct assault
on the opponent’s will and not a by-
product of destroying his capability to
wage war.” Just what the “opponent’s
will” constitutes is not clearly ad-
dressed. Is it the will of the soldiers in
the field, the will of the civilians sup-
porting the effort, or the will of the
leadership? The differences in Opera-
tion IRAQI FREEDOM are noteworthy.
The will of the Iraqi armed forces was
quickly broken, as they threw down
their arms and fled. But was the will of
Saddam, of the brothers Hussein, or of
the Iraqi resistance broken? How can
one confidently determine a change in
will, and how can one be totally sure
that the change is permanent? No
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